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I. INTRODUCTION 
Co-Appellant Hobson Fabricating Corporation, by and through its counsel 
of record, hereby respectfully submits its Reply on this appeal. 
The Respondent's brief is replete with wholesale irrelevancies, fanciful 
retellings of the "facts" and speculative, conclusory assertions about what DPW 
"would have proven" at trial. None of the "facts" around which DPW builds its 
Response are relevant on this appeal, because the issue before this Court is 
straightforward: after finding that DPW's counter-crossclaim was "barred," and 
that by defeating that claim the Contractors "prevailed in part" below, did the 
District Court err by not making an award to the Contractors under I.C. § 12-117, 
and particularly under I.C. § 12-117(2)? The District Court's denial of costs and 
fees to the Contractors failed to give meaning to I.C. § 12-117, and DPW's 
Response provides no reason why this Court should not overturn the District 
Court's error. 
The District Court's findings that DPW's counter-crossclaim was "barred," 
and that the Contractors were "prevailing in part" below should not be disturbed 
by this Court, because DPW has neither appealed from nor assigned error to 
those findings. Rather, Idaho authority states that those findings are conclusive. 
Even this Court's "free review" over an award made or denied under I.C. § 12-
117 does not allow it to either revisit or revise the District Court's findings 
regarding the counter-crossclaim and the determination that the Contractors 
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"prevailed in part." Therefore, the central issue to be decided here is-in light of 
those unchallenged findings-was the District Court required to have made an 
award of costs and attorney's fees under I.C. § 12-117 to the Contractors? 
Since the District Court determined that DPW's counter-crossclaim was 
"barred", nothing DPW's "expert" argued on summary judgment, nor what 
reliance DPW may have placed on such assertions is germane to this Court's 
consideration. Therefore, DPW's arguments that the "reasonableness" of the 
counter-crossclaim is demonstrated by opinions expressed by its expert or 
alternately, by "what it would have proven" at trial, are not properly considered on 
this appeal. 
DPW's claim was determined to have been "barred" by the District Court 
because of DPW's failures to have adhered to the contractual prerequisites that 
presumably would have allowed it. Here and inexplicably, DPW urges the Court 
to determine that regardless if a claim is wrongfully brought and maintained by a 
state agency at great expense to the "person" pursued is determined by a trial 
court to be "barred" ab intio, I.C. § 12-117 is not implicated. In light of the 
interpretations made of that statute by this Court, and the purposeful 
misinterpretations of the SE/Z contract repeatedly made by DPW in order to keep 
the counter-crossclaim from being dismissed, an award under I.C. § 12-117 was 
just not appropriate below, it was mandatory. 
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Since an award under the statute is mandatory upon a determination an 
agency's wrongful conduct in litigation, and since the District Court's finding that 
the DPW counter-crossclaim was "barred" clearly indicates that DPW's pursuit of 
the Contractors was without the requisite reasonable basis in fact or law, the 
District Court erred when it did not even address the applicability of I.C. § 12-117 
in denying the Contractors' motions for costs and attorney's fees. 
Given the interpretations of I.C. § 12-117 established as controlling 
precedent by this Court, the Contractors respectfully request that this Court, on 
its free review: a) determine that the District Court's denial of costs and fees to 
the Contractors under I.C. § 12-117 was error; b) reverse the District Court's 
denial of costs and attorney's fees to the Contractor, and remand the matter with 
instructions that the District Court make and enter such award based on the 
previous motions of the Contractors; and c) award the Contractors their costs 
and attorney's fees on this appeal. 
". AUTHORITY 
A. "FREE REVIEW" DOES NOT PERMIT DPW TO REARGUE THE 
FINDINGS OF FACT DETERMINED BY THE DISTRICT COURT, BUT 
ONLY PERMITS REVIEW OF THE PROPER APPLICATION OF THE 
LAW TO THE FINDINGS OF FACT THE DISTRICT COURT MADE. 
The District Court concluded as a matter of law that DPW's counter-
crossclaim was "barred," because it found as a matter of fact that DPW failed to 
satisfy the contractual prerequisites that would presumably have allowed that 
claim to be brought. In its Response, DPW mistakenly asserts that "free review" 
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allows this Court to revisit the District Court's factual findings, in apparent hope 
that DPW can avoid liability under I. C. § 12-117 for the wrongful prosecution of 
its "barred" counter-crossclaim. 
This Court has set out many times that its review in cases like this one is 
limited to the "free review" only of how the law was applied by the District Court, 
and that it does not engage in any reweighing of facts determined below: 
This Court will overturn a lower court's finding of fact only if clearly 
erroneous, and the existence of merely conflicting evidence does 
not meet this standard. It is not this Court's role to reweigh facts 
already found by the designated fact finder. 
Anderson v. Rex Hayes Family Trust, 145 Idaho 741,745,185 P.3d 253 (2008); 
accord, Hogg v. Wolske, 142 Idaho 549,556,130 P.3d 1087 (2006) ("It is not our 
role to reweigh the evidence"); see also, I.R.C.P 52(a) ("findings of fact shall not 
be set aside unless clearly erroneous"). 
This Court has repeatedly held that it will not find the existence of "clear 
error," in a matter in which the trial court's findings are supported by substantial 
and competent-even if conflicting--evidence. See, e.g., Rhodes v. State, 107 
Idaho 1120, 695 P.2d 1259 (1985); In Interest of Crum, 111 Idaho 407, 408-09, 
725 P.2d 112 (1986), citing inter alia, Rhodes; see also, Roell v. Boise City, 134 
Idaho 214,216,999 P.2d 251 (2000) citing, Conley v. Whittlesey, 133 Idaho 265, 
985 P .2d 1127 (1999). No clear error exists in this matter. 
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The evidence on which the District Court relied that DPW failed to comply 
with the contractual prerequisites of notice and opportunity to cure was not 
merely "substantial and competent." Rather, those findings of fact were 
undisputed, and they were admitted by DPW: 
Under the terms of the contract, the State was required to give the 
contractors a written notice of allegedly defective work and the 
opportunity to cure the alleged defect. .. [N]o such notice and 
opportunity to cure were given. 
R., Vol. IV, p.625 . 
... the Court has ruled that the State's cross-claims and offsets are 
barred by the notice and opportunity to cure provision ... 
R., Vol. IV, p. 738. The District Court cited to the Deposition testimony of DPW's 
interim administrator in its March 26, 2010 Order, which first held DPW's claim to 
be "barred." See, R. Vol. IV, p.625, citing, Deposition of Jan Frew, September 
18, 2008, p.263, II. 20-22 ("Well, after termination they were no longer under this 
contract, so we did not give them the opportunity nor want them to return to the 
jobsite."); p. 264 II. 1 (In response to a question as to whether the contractors 
were provided with notice or an opportunity to repair: "I don't believe so."; 22-23. 
("My understanding is that after termination we did not notify them to come and 
fix anything"). And, DPW's counsel also admitted in open court that DPW had 
not complied with the contractual prerequisites: "Now, did we give them an 
opportunity to cure? No." Tr., September 29, 2008, 20:8-9. 
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An Idaho appellate court's review is limited to determining whether the 
evidence presented at the trial court supports the findings of fact, and then 
whether those findings support the trial court's conclusions of law. See, e.g., 
Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 171, 16 P.3d 263 (2000). Based in no small 
part on DPW's admissions that it did not provide the Contractors with the 
requisite notice and opportunity to cure, the District Court determined that DPW's 
"cross-claims and offsets are barred by the notice and opportunity to cure 
provision ... " R., Vol. IV, p. 738. In denying DPW's Motion to Reconsider its 
March 26, 2010 ruling, the District Court cemented its determination that DPW's 
counter-crossclaim was inefficacious, when its said that at trial, DPW would be 
prohibited from "present[ing] evidence that would support a counter or cross 
claim .. " Id. at 744. 
Given a determination by this Court that substantial evidence supports the 
District Court's findings of fact with regard to DPW's failure to comply with the 
notice and opportunity to cure requirements of its contract with SE/Z, therefore 
"barring" the counter-crossclaim, under Baxter, supra, and like authority, the only 
consideration by this Court now is whether or not the District Court correctly 
applied the law to those findings of fact. Over that consideration alone, this Court 
exercises "free review." "[W]e exercise free review over the lower court's 
conclusions of law to determine whether the trial court correctly stated the 
applicable law, and whether the legal conclusions are sustained by the facts 
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found." Conley v. Whittlesey, 133 Idaho at 169-70 (emphasis added), citing, 
Burns v. Alderman, 122 Idaho 749,752-53, 838 P.2d 878, 881-82 (Ct. App. 
1992). 
With free review exercised only over the correct application to facts found, 
this Court should not engage in any re-analysis of the factual issues raised or 
argued in the various summary judgment motions reversed by the District Court's 
Orders of March 26, 2010 (R. Vol. IV, pp.619-28) and April 6, 2010 (R. Vol. IV, 
pp.730-44). The factual assertions made in those motions are superfluous to the 
issues before the Court on this appeal, because with DPW's counter-crossclaim 
held to be "barred," this Court exercises "free review" only over whether or not 
the District Court then correctly applied the law when it denied the Contractors' 
Motion for Award of Costs and Attorney's Fees. 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT'S DENIAL OF COSTS AND FEES TO THE 
CONTRACTORS WAS ERROR, BECAUSE THAT DENIAL FAILED TO 
CARRY OUT THE PURPOSES OF I.C. § 12-117. 
This Court has determined what the purposes of I.C. § 12-117 are: 
We believe the purpose of that statute is two-fold: (1) to serve as a 
deterrent to groundless or arbitrary agency action; and (2) to 
provide a remedy for persons who have borne unfair and unjustified 
financial burdens defending against groundless charges or 
attempting to correct mistakes agencies should never had made. 
Bogner v. State Dept. of Revenue and Taxation, State Tax Com'n, 107 Idaho 
854,859,693 P.2d 1056 (1984); accord, Fischer v. City of Ketchum, 141 Idaho 
349,356,109 P.3d 1091 (2005), citing, Bogner at 859. 
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Here, the District Court unquestionably held that the Contractors prevailed 
"in part" against DPW. See, R. Vol. VIII, p. 1558; p. 1559. Though the 
Contractors assert that it was error not to have determined them to be the sole 
prevailing party, the authority established by this Court makes clear that upon 
determining the Contractors to have prevailed "in part" by defeating DPW's 
"barred" counter-crossclaim, the District Court was required to make an award of 
costs and attorney's fees to the Contractors under I.C. § 12-117(2), and erred by 
not doing so. 
Idaho courts are instructed by this Court that "[s]tatutes must be read to 
give effect to every word, clause and sentence." Wright v. Willer, 111 Idaho 474, 
476, 725 P.2d 179 (1986), citing, Univ. of Utah Hosp. and Med. Ctr. v. Bethke, 
101 Idaho 245, 611 P.2d 1030 (1980). In order to properly carry out that 
instruction, the District Court was obligated to make an award of costs and 
attorney's fees to the Contractors based on its finding that DPW's claim was 
"barred" and the resultant ruling that the Contractors were "prevailing in part." In 
numerous decisions, this Court had held that I.C. § 12-117 is not discretionary, 
and a finding that an agency covered by the statute acted "without reasonable 
basis in fact or law" requires the court to make an award under that statute. See, 
e.g., Ralph Nay/or Farms v. Latah County, 144 Idaho 806, 809, 172 P.3d 1081 
(2007), citing, Fischer v. City of Ketchum, supra, 141 Idaho at 356. 
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The District Court's failure to even mention I.C. § 12-117 in its 
Memorandum Decision and Order of September 14, 2010 (R. Vol. VIII, p. 1554-
60) simply and impermissibly read I.C. § 12-117(2) out of existence, in a way that 
failed to give the statute (and that specific clause) the purpose for which this 
Court has held it was enacted. The District Court's failure to give meaning to I.C. 
§ 12-117(2) violates a long-expressed requirement in Idaho that "courts give 
effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction." See, 
e.g., Idaho Conservation League, Inc. v. Idaho Oep't of Agriculture, 143 Idaho 
366, 368, 146 P.2d 634 (2006), citing State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 
P.2d 685 (1999). 
Only if I.C. § 12-117 was ambiguous would a court, including this one, 
inquire as to the reasonableness of a proffered interpretation or application of it. 
See, e.g., Magic Valley Newspapers, Inc. v. Magic Valley Regional Med. Center, 
138 Idaho 143, 144, 59 P.3d 314 (2002). And, this Court has already held that 
I. C. § 12-117 is not ambiguous: 
In clear, unambiguous and mandatory language, I.C. § 12-117 
requires an award of reasonable attorney fees merely upon a 
showing "that the agency acted without reasonable basis in fact or 
law." 
Lockhart v. Oep't of Fish and Game, 121 Idaho 894, 898, 828 P.2d 1299 (1992) 
(emphasis added). 
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Both the purposes and mandatory nature of I.C. § 12-117 were 
impermissibly ignored by the District Court, when it failed to consider the statute 
in denying the Contractors' motions for costs and attorney's fees. As this Court 
has repeatedly held: 
Idaho Code Section 12-117 is not discretionary, but provides that 
the court must award attorney fees where a state agency did not 
act with a reasonable basis in fact or law in a proceeding involving 
a person who prevails in the action. 
Eacret v. Bonner County, 139 Idaho 780, 789, 86 P.3d 494 (2004) citing, 
Rincover v. State Dept. of Finance, Securities Bureau, 132 Idaho 547, 549, 976 
P.2d 473, 475 (1999). Here, as DPW had no reasonable basis to prosecute a 
"barred" claim against these Contractors for a period of years, and especially no 
reasonable basis to visit hundreds of thousands of dollars in costs and attorney's 
fees on the Contractors by so doing. 
Once the District Court found as a matter of fact that DPW had failed to 
comply with the contractual prerequisites that would have allowed its counter-
crosslaim, it properly determined as a matter of law that DPW's counter-
crossclaim was therefore "barred." What the District Court then failed to do, 
however, was to properly apply the mandatory provisions of I.C. § 12-117 on the 
Contractors' Motions for Award of Costs and Attorney's Fees. In order to give 
meaning to that statute, and to have it act as the preventative measure it was 
enacted to be, this Court should correct the District Court's error. 
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C. NO "BARRED" ACTION IS BROUGHT OR MAINTAINED WITH A 
REASONABLE BASIS IN LAW OR FACT. 
The concept of a "barred" claim is so axiomatic to lawyers and courts that 
little caselaw addresses it. Black's defines the noun "bar" as "a plea arresting a 
lawsuit or legal claim," and the verb "to bar" as "to prevent, esp. by legal 
objection." 143 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999). In illustrating its 
definition of "to bar," Black's offers "the statute of limitations barred the filing of 
the legal claims." Id. Synonyms of the verb "to bar" are also instructive as to 
what that term means, since included among the synonyms is: "circumscribe," 
"delimit" and "prelimit," each of which refers to the establishment of a limit on 
some action or thing. 1 
A number of holdings demonstrate that when used in a legal sense, "to 
bar" or "barred" refers to a claim or cause of action that is precluded from being 
brought, because it is without efficacy ab initio. "[S]ummary disposition is 
available when an action is barred due to the disposition of the claim before 
commencement of the action. Alcona Co. v. Wolverine Environ. Production, Inc., 
233 Mich. App. 238, 246, 590 N.W.2d 586 (1986) (emphasis added) (referring to 
claims on which summary disposition may be sought under Michigan Court Rule 
2-116(c)(7)2). 
1 See, respectively, 410, 597 and 1789 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 
(1981). 
2 "The claim is barred because of release, payment, prior judgment, immunity granted by law, 
statute of limitations, statute of frauds, an agreement to arbitrate, infancy or other disability of 
- 11 -
In regard to a plaintiff's appeal of the dismissal of its Complaint on a 
demurrer, and its assertion that the trial court should have allowed amendment to 
correct "defects" in the Complaint, the California Court of Appeals observed: 
"amendment could not correct a deficiency in the complaint or where the action is 
barred as a matter of law, the demurrer is properly sustained without leave to 
amend." State of California Auto. Dismantlers Assn. v. Interinsurance Exchange, 
180 Cal.App.3d 735, 742, 225 Cal.Rptr. 676 (1986), citing, Saltier v. Pierce Bros. 
Mortuaries, 81 Cal.App.3d 292, 146 Cal.Rptr. 271 (1978). Further illustrating that 
"barred" claims cannot be prosecuted, the Auto Dismantlers court held that, 
"[I]eave to amend is appropriately withheld where it is clear the plaintiff is seeking 
a legally impossible result." 180 Cal.App.3d at 735, citing, Robinson v. 
Robinson, 198 Cal.App.2d 193, 197, 17 Cal.Rptr. 786 (1961). It is inherent in 
the District Court's finding that DPW's claim was "barred" that the claim could not 
have been brought from the outset, and that DPW's having done so was 
wrongful. As such, the District Court erred when it failed to properly consider its 
own findings when applying the law germane to the Contractors' Motion for 
Award of Costs and Attorney's Fees. 
the moving party, or assignment or other disposition of the claim before commencement of the 
action." 
- 12 -
D. DPW'S MISREPRESENTATIONS OF THE "PLAIN AND 
UNAMBIGUOUS" LANGUAGE OF THE CONTRACT ALLOWED IT TO 
CONTINUE TO PROSECUTE ITS WRONGFUL CLAIM AGAINST THE 
CONTRACTORS, AT HUGE EXPENSE TO THEM. 
The District Court repeatedly found that the contract between DPW and 
SE/Z was "clear and unambiguous." See, e.g., R., Vol. II, p.258; R., Vol. IV, p. 
628; Id. at 735. As such, interpretations of that contract were for the District Court 
to make as a matter of law. See, e.g., Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 63, 106 
P.3d 376 (citation omitted). 
The District Court ultimately dismissed DPW's counter-crossclaim on 
March 26, 2010, affirming that decision when it denied reconsideration on April 2, 
2010. However, for nearly four years before then, the Contractors made several 
attempts on summary judgment to demonstrate to the District Court that DPW 
was precluded from bringing its counter-crossclaim, based on DPW's failure to 
provide the requisite notices and opportunity to cure required under several 
provisions of the contract. 
In its Memorandum Decision and Order on Plaintiff's Motion in Limine, the 
District Court recounted DPW's positions on motions brought by the Contractors, 
all of which ignored or obfuscated DPW's obligations to provide written notice 
and an opportunity to cure under before it could assert any claims against the 
Contractors: 
The State has previously urged the Court that the law should allow 
the State the opportunity to show, in order to be relieved of the 
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contractual obligation to provide notice and an opportunity to cure, 
that the contracts had actual knowledge of the alleged defects and 
that the contractors suffered no prejudice by the State's failure to 
provide notice and an opportunity to cure. 
R., Vol. IV, p. 625. 
On April 14, 2006, Defendant SEll filed a motion for summary 
judgment seeking a ruling that the State had no ability to maintain 
the cross-claims to recover for damages for the repair and 
replacement of allegedly defective work found after the contractor 
filed suit against the State. At that time the Court was persuaded 
that Article 13.4.2 of the contract preserved the State's right to 
pursue the cross-claims ... While that provision on its fact allows the 
State to pursue its own independent claims against the contractors, 
the Court finds that its ability to pursue those actions is otherwise 
foreclosed by its failure to provide notice and opportunity to cure. 
R., Vol. IV, p. 626. 
DPW repeatedly misrepresented to the District Court what the contract 
required of it before it could bring any claim against SEll or Hobson, including 
particularly the counter-crossclaim, which was specifically conditioned on DPW's 
adherence to the prerequisite conditions of written notice and opportunity to cure 
included in Article 2.4.1 of the contract. See, R. Vol. II, p. 365; R. Vol. IV, p. 625. 
DPW was the drafter of the SEll contract, and under Idaho law is charged with 
having that agreement construed against it. See, e.g., Big Butte Ranch, Inc. v. 
Grasnick,91 Idaho 6,9,415 P.2d 48 (1966). 
Still, rather than withdraw its cross-counterclaim, DPW forged ahead, 
misrepresenting the contract and the law to the District Court: 
We are not precluded by any language in this contract from 
asserting claims under this contract. We are not precluded by any 
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language in this contract from properly asserting warranty claims, 
or express warranty claims, or straight breach claims, when we 
discover them. 
Tr., October 15, 2008, 109: 14-20 (emphasis added). That representation by 
DPW was simply false, just as were the misrepresentations made in 2006 and 
2007 that "persuaded" the District Court not to dismiss DPW's claims. Ignoring 
both the effect of its termination of the Contractors for convenience under Article 
14.4 of the SE/Z contract (see, R., Vol. 11., p. 397). and its failure to have 
provided any notice and opportunity to cure as required by Article 2.4.1, DPW 
told the District Court that nothing in the agreement precluded its counter-
crossclaim when plainly, nothing could have been further from the truth. 
And, based on DPW's misrepresentations, the District Court allowed 
DPW's counter-crossclaim to survive in 2006, 2007 and 2008, and did not 
ultimately dismiss it until March 2010. And, during that time, the counter-
crossclaim--by far the largest claim in the action below (see, R. Vol. V., pp. 938-
39)--caused the Contractors to incur hundreds of thousands of dollars in costs 
and attorney's fees (see, Id., 939-40; 947-59) in defending against it. In giving 
meaning and purpose to I.C. § 12-117, as the parties "prevailing (at least) in part" 
against DPW's wrongful cross-counterclaim, the Contractors were entitled to an 
award under I.C. § 12-117(2) below, because they have "borne [the] unfair and 
unjustified financial burdens [incurred in] defending against groundless charges" 
brought in this matter by DPW. 
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E. DPW ASSIGNED NO ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDINGS, 
AND THEREFORE IS PRECLUDED FROM ASSERTING THAT THE 
"FACTS" ALLEGED BY IT IN THE OVERTURNED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT MOTIONS IS A PROPER BASIS FOR FINDING ITS 
PURSUIT OF A "BARRED" CLAIM TO HAVE BEEN "REASONABLE." 
Since long before Statehood, this Court has held that matters--including a 
trial court's findings of fact--to which no assignment of error is made, are not 
reviewable on appeal. See, e.g., Martineau v. Walker, 97 Idaho 246, 247, 542 
P.2d 1165 (1975); Bicandi v. Boise Payette Lumber Co., 55 Idaho 543, 44 P.2d 
1103, 1107 (1935) (citations omitted) ("This court will not review acts of a district 
court which has not been assigned as error.") Coeur D'Alenes Lead Co. v. 
Kingsbury, 56 Idaho 475,55 P.2d 1307, 1310 (1936); Purdy v. Steel, 1 Idaho 216 
(Terr. Rptr. 1868) (citation omitted) ("we would treat all exceptions taken in the 
court below as waived unless they were assigned as errors in this court."). DPW 
did not cross-appeal the District Court's ruling on any finding of fact,3 and 
therefore assigned no error to either of the District Court's findings that: a) DPW's 
claim was "barred,,4; or b) the Contractors "prevailed in part,,5 by defeating the 
counter-crossclaim. With those two facts considered to be "conclusive" on this 
appeal, and no appeal made as to the District Court's decision to overturn its 
previous interlocutory orders on the various motions for partial summary 
3 The Settlement Agreement between these parties called for a resolution of all causes of 
action, reserving only the issues of the determination of prevailing party status and the 
entitlement to costs and attorney's fees for the District Court. See, R., Vol. IV, p. 748; R. Vol. 
V, p. 875. 
4 See, e.g., R. Vol. IV, p. 738. 
5 R. Vol. VIII, p. 1559. 
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judgment,6 no factual assertion made in those motions is able to be tested here, 
even on a "free review." 
The assertions of fact made in the original motions for partial summary 
judgment, and repeated in DPW's Response are but surplusage. No fact 
asserted at any time in a lawsuit has the ability to make a "barred" cause of 
action efficacious. If a party is precluded from bringing a cause of action 
because of whatever reason, i.e., due to a statutory bar, the action being time-
barred, or as in this matter, the cause of action is barred for failure to have 
satisfied the contractual prerequisites that would (presumably) have allowed it, 
no "fact" alleged by any witness, whether lay or expert, and no offer of "what 
would be proven" at trial can lift the "bar" to that cause of action. See, e.g" Hays 
V. State, 132 Idaho 516,520,975 P.2d 1181 (Ct.App. 1999) (claim of actual 
innocence not able to be considered when procedurally barred); Hoglan v. First 
Security Bank of Idaho, N.A., 120 Idaho 682,685,819 P.2d 100 (1991) (claim for 
libel barred by statute of limitations improperly submitted to the jury); Myers v. 
City of Pocatello, 98 Idaho 168, 169-70, 559 P.2d 1136 (1977) (malicious 
prosecution action not timely commenced was barred by applicable statute of 
limitations, and therefore properly dismissed by the trial court). 
6 Idaho considers orders granted on summary judgment to be interlocutory, and subject to 
revision by a trial court at any time through the time of entry of final judgment. See, e.g., Tiegs 
v. Robertson, 149 Idaho 482,485,236 P.3d 474 (Ct. App. 2010); see a/so, I.R.C.P. 54(b). 
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Reliance on what evidence might have been provided at trial does not 
excuse DPW's wrongful multi-year pursuit of a barred counter-crossclaim, or 
render that pursuit "reasonable." DPW was able to defeat the Contractors' 
motions for partial summary judgment and maintain its counter-crossclaim only 
because it purposefully obfuscated and misinterpreted the SE/Z contract to the 
District Court. This included DPW's assertions-in contravention to the plain 
language of a contract the District Court found to be "clear and unambiguous"-
that it was somehow not bound by the notice and opportunity to cure provisions 
of that agreement. See, supra, Tr., October 15, 2008, 109:14-20, 177:10-13. 
This despite the fact that DPW prepared that agreement, even if the notice and 
opportunity to cure provisions of it were ambiguous (something DPW never 
contended and the District Court did not find), those provisions would still have to 
be construed against DPW. See, e.g., Freeman & Co. v. Bolt, 132 Idaho 152, 
156,968 P.2d 247 (Ct. App. 1998), citing, Haener v. Ada Cty. Highway Dist., 108 
Idaho 170, 173, 697 P.2d 1184 (1985). 
Not surprisingly, DPW cites no authority that holds it to be "reasonable" (or 
even excusable) for a party to purposefully or recklessly misinterpret a "clear and 
ambiguous" contract created before the court, so long as the aim is to avoid 
dismissal of that party's claims. And though it may seem ludicrous that such 
authority could exist, that is essentially what DPW is asking this Court to hold. 
This despite DPW having not cross-appealed on any issue, including any 
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challenge to the District Court's findings regarding the efficacy of the counter-
crossclaim or the determination that the Contractors prevailed "in part" below. 
DPW's Response does not straightforwardly address the issues on 
appeal, because the District Court's findings are conclusive here, and the correct 
application of I.C. § 12-117 warrants for a reversal of the District Court's denial of 
costs and attorney's fees to the Contractors. Instead, DPW has opted for an 
flanking attack on the Contractors' position, asking this Court to ignore the 
established facts, including notably that DPW's barred claim visited hundreds of 
thousands of dollars in needless and wasteful expense on these Contractors. 
In its Response, DPW carefully steers clear of even addressing the 
purpose for which this Court has held that I.C. § 12-117 was enacted. Instead, 
DPW reargues a set of wholly unproven allegations regarding allegedly deficient 
work, in the apparent hope that the Court will ignore the conclusively established 
facts, and will opt not to give meaning to that statute. The District Court's failure 
to have enforced I.C. § 12-117 in this matter was error, which these Contractors 
now respectfully contend should be corrected by this Court. 
F. THIS MATTER IS NOT PROPERLY DEEMED A "MATTER OF FIRST 
IMPRESSION" IN REGARD TO THE APPROPRIATENESS OF AN 
AWARD OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES FOLLOWING 
MISINTERPRETATIONS MADE BY ONE PARTY TO A COURT. 
This Court has ruled that a party can be denied costs and attorney's fees 
under I.C. § 12-117 if the action was a "matter of first impression." However, this 
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matter is readily and completely distinguishable from the cases in which this 
Court denied fees on that basis. Those denials have uniformly involved a new or 
initial interpretation of a statute, while this matter turns on DPW's unreasonable 
actions under a contract of its own creation. Consequently, while there is no 
analog to the cases denying fees based on "first impression" statutory 
interpretations, this matter analogizes favorably with those cases in which this 
Court sustained or ordered an award of fees under I.C. § 12-117 due to an 
agency's misinterpretation of a "clear and unambiguous" statute or 
administrative rule. 
In State Oep't of Finance v. Resource Service Co., Inc., 134 Idaho 282, 1 
P.3d 783 (2000), this Court discussed at length the basis for denying fees under 
I.C. § 12-117 because the matter was of "first impression." That case (URSC If') 
involved but two issues, whether the appellant was entitled to an award of costs 
and fees under I.C. § 12-117, both for the trial court action and on appeal. In 
Resource Service Co., Inc. v. State Oep't of Finance (dubbed "RSC I" by this 
Court), 130 Idaho 877, 950 P.2d 249 (1997), this Court reversed an order on 
summary judgment that Resource Service Co. ("RSC") had violated the Idaho 
Securities Act, I.C. 30-14, et.seq. This Court remanded to the District Court, 
which dismissed the Department's action and denied RSC's application for costs 
and fees under I.C. § 12-117. 134 Idaho at 283. RSC appealed that denial. 
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In affirming the District Court's denial to RSC, this Court determined that 
RSC /I was like its findings in Rincover v. State Oep't of Finance, supra, and 
Treasure Valley Concrete, Inc. v. State, 132 Idaho 673, 978 P.2d 233 (1999), two 
actions in which it determined that the State's actions were not "unreasonable" 
because its actions involved "first impression" interpretations of statutes (I.C. §§ 
30-1413 and 47-701, respectively). This matter, however, is nothing like RSC II, 
Rincover or Treasure Valley Concrete, and therefore warrants a completely 
different result. 
This matter is like the line of cases in which this Court has upheld an 
award, or has made an award itself under I. C. § 12-117, because of an agency's 
failure to properly interpret a "clear and unambiguous" regulation or statute. 
Here, DPW brought its counter-crossclaim against the Contractors, despite the 
fact that its failure to follow the "clear and unambiguous" contract it provided 
precluded it from doing so. A significant line of cases provides that an award 
under I.C. § 12-117 is appropriate when an agency misinterprets or misapplies 
something "clear and unambiguous," the clear understanding of which it is 
charged with knowing. See, e.g., In re Elliott, 141 Idaho 177, 108 P.3d 324 
(2005) ("erroneous interpretation" of a "clear and unambiguous' statute); Lane 
Ranch P'ship v. City of Sun Valley, 145 Idaho 87, 175 P.3d 776 (2007) 
(municipality abused its discretion interpreting an ordinance); Fischer v. City of 
Ketchum, supra, 141 Idaho at 352, (municipality's failure to act with reasonable 
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basis interpreting conditional use permit process); Gardiner v. Boundary County 
Bd. of Commissioners, 148 Idaho 764, 229 P.3d 369, 374 (2010) (acts contrary 
to an unambiguous state statute and local ordinance). 
DPW issued the SE/Z contract, and therefore knew that its termination of 
SE/Z for convenience, coupled with its failure to have provided the Contractors 
with notice and opportunity to cure absolutely prohibited it from bringing its 
counter-crossclaim. DPW then misinterpreted the contract to the District Court, 
and asserted in a manner wholly contrary to the "plain and unambiguous" 
language in the agreement that it was excepted from having to comply with the 
contract's requirements. "We are not precluded by any language in this contract 
from asserting claims under this contract." Tr., October 15, 2008, 109:14-15 
(emphasis added). 
That affirmative statement made by DPW to the District Court was untrue, 
and was a bald-faced misstatement of the contract's meaning, made by the entity 
that provided the contract, and against which it must be construed. Ultimately, 
the District Court understood that statement to have been false, when it held 
DPW's counter-crossclaim to be "barred" for its failure to follow the contract. 
DPW's misstatements about the contract's meaning and requirements 
undoubtedly contributed to the District Court's reticence to dismiss the counter-
crossclaim, and wrongfully preserved DPW's claims against the Contractors. 
The effect of that preservation was many scores of thousands of dollars in 
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needless expenses borne by the Contractors to defend against DPW's "barred" 
claim. 
The consideration of whether an award of attorney's fees is appropriate 
after a litigant's purposeful or reckless misrepresentations or misinterpretations to 
a court is hardly a "matter of first impression" in Idaho. In this Court's recent 
decision in Allied Bail Bonds, Inc. v. County of Kootenai, 151 Idaho 405, 258 
P.3d 340 (2011), it granted attorney's fees on appeal under I.C. § 12-117(1} in a 
matter in which the appellant "misrepresented controlling precedent in its 
briefing" and "unreasonably pursued this appeal even though it failed to comply 
with the notice requirement of ... I.C. § 6-610." Id.7 See also, J-U-B Engineers, 
Inc. v. Security Ins. Co. of Hartford, 146 Idaho 311, 193 P.3d 858 (2008) 
(attorney's fees under I.C. § 12-121 awarded in part because appellant 
"misrepresented legal authority"); Bogner v. State Oep't of Revenue and 
Taxation, supra, 107 Idaho at 859 (attorney's fees under I.C. § 12-121 awarded 
in part for commission's "misinterpretation" of statutes). 
DPW cannot properly seek to avoid the consequences of its wrongful 
representations to the District Court on the basis that this matter is one of "first 
impression." While no decision of this Court may have pointedly addressed a 
factual scenario in which a state agency wrongfully pursued a "barred" claim, 
more than adequate authority exists to allow this Court to determine that DPW's 
7 This opinion was released on July 8, 2011, and no pinpoint citations for it are yet available. 
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actions in seeking to bring, pursue and prolong a wrongfully brought claim 
warranted an award of costs and attorney's fees under I.C. § 12-117 below. 
Much in keeping with the old saw, "if it looks like a duck and quacks like a duck," 
here, there is no question but that DPW's actions in pursuing these Contractors 
was wrongful, and met the standard of having been pursued without the requisite 
"reasonable bases" in law and fact. 
III. CONCLUSION 
On its consideration of the Contractors' joint motion for award of costs and 
fees, the District Court was required to have reconciled both I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1 )(8) 
and the mandatory requirements of I.C. § 12-117 in a manner that gave meaning 
to both the rule and statute. When it failed to do so after finding DPW's counter-
crossclaim to be "barred," and also finding that by defeating DPW's claim, the 
Contractors "prevailed in part," the District Court erred. 
While the Contractors contend that the District Court further erred by not 
finding them to be the substantially prevailing party, and therefore entitled to an 
award of costs and attorney's fees under I.C. § 12-117(1), there can be no 
question on this appeal that given the District Court's findings (not challenged on 
this appeal) it was unquestionably error to deny the Contractors costs and 
attorney's fees under I.C. § 12-117(2). 
The deterrent purpose of I.C. § 12-117 is fulfilled when wrongdoing by a 
state agency requires it to bear the costs of litigation in which it never should 
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have been involved. In this instance, the District Court's denial of the Contractors' 
request for award of costs and attorney's fees not only failed to repay the 
Contractors for DPW's wrongful action, it also read the statute out of existence, 
which this Court simply does not allow. 
With the District Court's findings conclusive on this appeal, Hobson, on 
behalf of both Contractors respectfully requests that this Court do what the 
District Court failed to do, and fulfill the purposes for which I.C. § 12-117 was 
enacted. Hobson requests that the Court reverse the District Court's 
determination that the Contractors were not the substantially prevailing parties 
and remand this matter with instructions that the District Court make an award to 
them under I.C. § 12-117(1). 
Alternately, Hobson respectfully requests that the Court, based on the 
District Court's finding that the Contractors "prevailed in part," remand this matter 
to the District Court with instructions that it make an award to the Contractors 
under I.C. § 12-117(2). 
Third, Hobson respectfully requests that this Court reverse the District 
Court's award of expenses to the Individual Defendants, due to its failure to have 
properly considered that award from the "overall" perspective required in 
multi-party, multi-claim actions. 
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Finally, based on DPW's misrepresentations below, Hobson respectfully 
requests that the Court make an award of the Contractors' costs and attorney's 
fees on this appeal pursuant to I.C. § 12-117. 
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